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This thesis examines the current and the future efforts to modernize ammunition
handling capability in the Republic of Korea and the United States. It describes how
these improvement programs will enhance the current capability of Chinhae, Korea
and Concord, California, the proposed containerized ammunition handling ports of
the two countries, to ensure success of the Major Regional Conflict-West (MRC-W)
scenario as outlined in the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) 1992. Also, various
containerized ammunition related issues such as the lessons learned from TURBO
Containerized Ammunition Distribution System (CADS) Exercise 1994 and Desert
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Over twenty years ago the commercial maritime industry began replacing
breakbulk cargo operations with the more efficient intermodal containerization system. As
the use of containers increased, so did the number of container vessels. Today, container
vessels have effectively replaced the breakbulk ship. This change in the composition of the
commercial maritime industry is forcing a reevaluation of United States strategic lift
doctrine.
Prior to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, strategic planners relied on
breakbulk ships to support deployed forces. Mobilization was seldom an issue as there was
an ample reserve of these types of vessels. Additionally, the commercial maritime industry
was capable of augmenting any deficiency in sealift capability. However, today, the
availability of breakbulk ships in ready reserve force is diminishing as they are deterio-
rating with age. Despite the drastic decline in available breakbulk ships, the military
continues to lift ammunition via this platform. This practice is primarily due to the lack of
container handing capability at ammunition facilities around the world. Indeed, recent
military exercises and contingencies, e.g., Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
would have benefited from the ability to use containerized shipment of ammunition.
Presently, the Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North Carolina (MOTSU)
is the only CONUS ammunition port facility with the throughput capacity required to
support future major regional conflicts as outlined in the 1992 Mobility Requirements
Study (MRS). Presently, MOTSU maintains 87% of the total ammunition handling
capability in CONUS. The MRS indicated that improvement of the West Coast
ammunition handling capability is necessary to achieve a more balanced strategic
capability. However, output capability at CONUS ports of embarkation (POE) is only one
part of the problem facing strategic planners. If the goal of complete containerized
shipments of ammunition is to be achieved, ports of debarkation (POD) must have
comparable capability.
The United States military presence in the Republic of Korea (ROK) currently
stands at approximately 35,000 personnel. Ammunition required to support these forces
arrives at one port of entry, Chinhae. The port facility currently receives ammunition via
breakbulk cargo ships. Because of the use of breakbulk which requires greater onload and
offload time, Chinhae is subsequently unable to provide the throughput capacity required
to support a military contingency in the region. This thesis will primarily examine what
initiative are currently being taken and should be taken in the future to modernize the
existing facilities in the ROK and the U.S. in order to handle the necessary throughput
capacity in this region.
B. ADVANTAGES OF CONTAINERIZED SHIPPING OF AMMUNITION
Presently, most U.S. military ammunition operations employ breakbulk transport
methods. The breakbulk process involves loading cargo into the open hold of a general
breakbulk cargo ship. The cargo holds of these ships are partitioned by decks and vertical
bulkheads, providing open areas for cargo storage. Cargo is lowered into the hold by a
crane and is then positioned to facilitate additional stowage. The ammunition is usually
divided into pallet sized loads. This is a time consuming process which requires large
amounts of dunnage (wood supports) to brace the cargo and prevent movement.
Prior to loading ammunition into a breakbulk cargo hold, the area must be
prepared with a layer of sheathing to prevent any metal-to-metal contact by the munitions.
As each layer is completed, another layer of dunnage is placed around the pallet to support
the load and to prevent contact with other weapons.
Containerizing ammunition eliminates the slow, inefficient and tedious method
described above. Pre-stuffed containers arrive at POEs where they are staged or loaded
onto container ships. The storage capacity of container vessels is vastly superior to that of
breakbulk ships. Data obtained from the MRS indicates that container ships have about
2.6 times the capacity of breakbulk ships. Additionally, the on/offload time decreases
approximately 75% when container ships are employed.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
The study will be divided into three major parts. First, current and future efforts to
upgrade existing ammunition facility of Chinhae, ROK will be examined. Second,
emphasis will be placed on the future modernization of the ammunition facility in Concord,
CA and how this project along with the project in Korea can better meet the requirements
mandated by the Major Regional Conflict-West (MRC-W) scenario. Third, the outcomes
of the recent Turbo Containerized Ammunition Distribution System (CADS) military
exercise as well as other containerization related issues will be reviewed to gain further
insight in the DoD efforts to improve containerized ammunition distribution.
D. THESIS QUESTIONS
The primary questions addressed by this thesis are:
1
)
How can the current ammunition handling facilities of Chinhae and Concord be
modernized to support MRC-W scenario; what is currently being done and what
will be the benefits of these modernized facilities?
The secondary questions addressed by this thesis are:
2) How did containerization of ammunition come about?
3) What are shipboard methods of transportation of ammunition in the past and
present?
4) What is the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study and its significance?
5) How can lessons learned from recent Turbo Containerized Ammunition
Distribution System Exercise be applied to improve future ammunition distribution
system?
6) What are the different types of ammunition containers that are currently in the
DoD inventory?
7) How extensively was containerization utilized in sealift operations during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm?
8) What is the current status and capability ofDoD sealift and commercial
maritime assets as related to containerization of ammunition in the U.S.?
9) What materials and equipment are necessary to fully modernize and operate a
containerized ammunition handling facility?
E. THESIS STRUCTURE
This thesis is presented in five chapters. Chapter I serves as an introduction to the
research issues. Chapter II gives the reader background on the various issues that are
relevant to containerized ammunition. Chapter III discusses the current containerized
ammunition efforts in the ROK as pertinent to the modernization of Chinhae Ammunition
Pier. In Chapter IV, containerized ammunition efforts in the US are discussed, focusing
on the proposal to modernize Naval Weapons Station Concord and potential cost savings
through these efforts. Chapter V summarizes the thesis research findings and also makes





This chapter highlights various issues that are relevant to ammunition
containerization to gain further insight into DoD efforts to improve ammunition
containerization and distribution. First, it describes the significance of the Mobility
Requirements Study. Second, the lessons learned from the United States Transportation
Command sponsored TURBO Containerized Ammunition Distribution System Exercise
and Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the vulnerability of Ready Reserve Force readiness
are discussed in regard to their implications for the logistics of ammunition handling.
B. MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY (MRS)
In the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress tasked the
Department of Defense (DoD) with conducting a study of the military's future mobility
requirements. This study was headed by the Director for Force Structure, Resources and
Assessment (J-8) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In January 1992, the Director, J-8, along
with the Advisory Group and Coordinating Committee, issued their expectations and
recommendations as the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). One of the primary areas
focused by this study was strategic mobility, the ability to transport sufficient quantities of
men and material in support of military contingency abroad. The MRS provided a detailed
analysis of the existing military transportation infrastructure in an effort to determine
requirements of the Armed Services for future military contingencies. The study outlined
three scenarios, two separate major regional conflicts, and two near simultaneous major
regional conflicts (MRCs). The scenarios were designated MRC-East, MRC-West, and
MRC-East and West. Data obtained from the experiences and statistics of Operations
Desert Shield/ Storm was used as a baseline for the analysis. [Ref. 1 :p. ES-1]
Pertaining to ammunition distribution, the MRS indicated that the capability to
move ammunition was not adequate to meet scenario throughput requirements. [Ref. 1 :p.
E-I-5] The insufficient output capacity ofCONUS facilities presented a risk to deployed
forces. The Gulf War experience revealed that there were only three facilities capable of
ammunition distribution. The three facilities were MOTSU, and Naval Weapons Stations
in Earle, New Jersey and Concord, California. Currently, MOTSU is the only facility with
significant ammunition handling capability, breakbulk or container. Recommendations of
MRS included:
(1) integration of containerization as the primary mode of ammunition
transportation and
(2) upgrade of existing facilities to appropriate output levels and the establishment
of a West Coast container facility.
Recommendation one would make ammunition distribution more efficient,
reducing the risk of undersupply to deployed forces in a contingency. Recommendation
two would be required if the benefit of containerization was to be realized. Hence,
upgrading the Concord facility would provide a West Coast capability to handle large
amounts of containerized ammunition and decentralize the national ammunition output
capacity. As a result, upgrading Concord would allow the U.S. to distribute ammunition
more rapidly to the Western Pacific as well as Indian Ocean areas.
The MRS stated that CONUS based ammunition requirements to support a major
regional conflict vary between 294,182 STONS and 478,000 STONS. Currently MOTSU
can load 8,700 STONS (600 TEUs) per day, matching Chinhae's future anticipated
offload capability. However due to the distance of these two ports, shipments would be in
transit for at least 16 days by a container vessel, significantly increasing the risk to
deployed forces in a contingency. On the other hand, linking Chinhae to Concord can
potentially save approximately 5 days. This is why the MRS has identified a West Coast
ammunition container port at Concord as a solution.
C. TURBO CONTAINERIZED AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
(CADS) 1994
1. Purpose
Conducted from 1 Aug. to 27 Nov. 1994, TURBO CADS 1994 was United States
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) sponsored joint exercise in the Pacific
designed to test the effectiveness of ammunition shipment through intermodalism. Simply
put, intermodalism is a method of a material shipment in containers that integrates rail,
highway, and water modes of transportation to provide door-to-door service.
USTRANSCOM' s goal was to promote an effective and efficient intermodal
container transportation system by increasing DoD's use of intermodal systems, ensuring
interoperability between DoD and commercial systems and maximum use of intermodal
assets and infrastructure. [Ref. 2:p. 10]
2. Background
The Containerized Ammunition Distribution System (CADS) has been successfully
implemented in the European theater in the recent years. Shipments from CONUS
ammunition plants and depots have been routinely transported to Germany via Internation
Standards Organization (ISO) containers. This has been possible due to adequate
container handling infrastructure at POEs and PODs. The success of the intermodal
operation in the European theater warranted a review of other export ammunition
shipments to determine the validity and applicability of container delivery to various sites
in the Pacific theater.
On 19 November 1993, the United States Commander in Chief Pacific
(USCINCPAC) established a munitions containerization working group. This group
became responsible to develop a time-phased action plan leading to institutionalizing
containerized ammunition shipments in the Pacific region. After several meetings, it was
determined that there was a definite need to demonstrate the alternatives to breakbulk and
to push the worldwide ammunition logistics system to modernization because the present
munitions delivery system relied too heavily on breakbulk movement of munitions. [Ref.
3:p.l]
3. Concept of Operations
The overall concept of TURBO CADS 1994 was to conduct an intermodal
shipment of munitions from multiple CONUS origins to multiple United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM) destinations. First, containerized ammunition was moved from
eight different ammunition depots in the U.S. to NWS Concord, CA and Port Hadlock,
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WA, POEs. From these POEs, the containerized ammunitions were moved to their
respective destinations in Guam, Japan, and ROK by SS Gem state, a craneship from the
Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) and by MV Green wave, a MSC charted vessel, both self-
sustaining containerships. Approximately 1150 TEUs were transported during the
exercise. [Ref. 3: p. 2]
4. Objectives
TURBO CADS 1994 had several objectives including:
1) Evaluate on-hand CHE, and identify other equipment shortages
2) Identify shortfalls in the transportation system that could prevent the routine
continuous use of containerized munitions
3) Demonstrate the usefulness and ease of use of blocking and bracing
improvements compared to breakbulk.
4) Observe inland rail movement of containerized munitions to designated
unstuffing locations in Korea.
5) Observe containerized munitions transfer operations at various inland locations.
6) Assist in the development of container doctrine as well as hardware
requirements and applications ofCADS doctrine.
7) Exercise NWS Concords container throughput capability. [Ref. 3:p.3]
5. Lessons Learned
As stated in the USTRANCOM's TURBO CADS 1994 After Action Report, "the
exercise provided a unique opportunity to test specific USPACOM units' capability to
deliver/receive munitions in containers; to educate munitions requisitioners relative to their
capability to order munitions and develop the requirement for containerized munitions
delivery; and to document improvements and weaknesses within USPACOM for
li
munitions movements and handling efficiency, and overall increased throughput
capability." [Ref. 3:p. 5]
Overall, the exercise effectively executed its objectives and proved to be quite
successful without major problems. However, one area of significant concern that became
obvious throughout the exercise was the lack of container handling equipment (CHEs).
The problem ranged from few quantities at some locations to none at other locations. It
was noted in the after action report that at some locations, CHEs were borrowed from
other DoD activities, while other locations had to lease the equipment. The report also
pointed out that the prospect was even worse in OCONUS. Based on the provided
information, it is quite obvious that the lack of CHEs could have a detrimental effect on
large scale container operations. In order to effectively handle the container flow, each
location should have had at least two CHEs during the exercise.
Most ports in the Pacific arena are not built with shoreside cranes designed to
conduct heavy-lift container operation, and therefore, vessel selection for the exercise was
restricted to ships that can load and offload themselves without a crane mounted on the
pier. Therefore, it was also recommended in the after action report that self-sustaining
containership should continue to be utilized for future exercises or that portable cranes be
placed on non-self sustaining containerships. The above recommendation is not only
relevant in the case of Chinhae but also at NWS Concord, which demonstrated the need to
invest in CHEs as well. Until both facilities are fully equipped with modern container
handling capability, it is evident that ammunition shipment through intermodalism won't be
fully optimized. The container throughput capability at these facilities are highly
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dependent on the future infrastructure improvements at these sites and thus, future
TURBO CADS exercises with similar scope will result in higher container throughput only
when these facilities are fully modernized. Additionally, there will be a greater potential
for interoperability between DoD and commercial systems through the future
infrastructure improvement in at these facilities.
D. AMMUNITION CONTAINERS
The DoD has a variety of containers and handling equipment intended to be used
during a mobilization of forces. This section will examine the various types of containers
that are currently in the DoD inventory which are utilized for the movement of
ammunition.
1. MILVAN - Ammunition Restraint
The MILVAN is a specially designed container developed specifically to carry
ammunition. The MILVAN has an internal restraint system that is made up of rails
permanently installed along the sides of the container and adjustable crossbars designed to
keep the ammunition from moving inside the container. Most MILVAN are 8-feet wide,
8-feet high and 10-feet long, however some have been procured that are 8.5-feet high.
Both MILVAN sizes also meet Internation Standards Organization (ISO) requirements.
[Ref. 4:p. 3]
2. 20-Foot ISO End - Opening Container
These containers are standard 8-feet wide, 8-feet high, 20 feet long container used
in the commercial industry with one modification. The door and cornerposts have been
modified with angle iron to enhance blocking and bracing required for ammunition, to
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allow wooden dunnage to be used without distributing the force to the door. These
containers also have standard handling fittings on the top of the container as well as
forklift pockets along the bottom. [Ref. 4:p. 7]
The end-opening container will probably be the cornerstone of the DoD's general
container system. It is currently the standard throughout the commercial industry and, as
such, is the most familiar to those involved in stuffing and unstuffing containers.
3. 20-Foot ISO Side - Opening Container
These containers are similar to the 20-foot ISO end-opening container with one
exception. They have two double doors located on the side of the container instead of a
door at one end. These containers provide easy access to their contents by a forklift, and
they also are fitted with internal tie down rings for securing ammunition. [Ref. 4:p. 13]
Side-Opening Containers provide a unique way to unstuff the container. It is easy
for almost any forklift to reach the cargo inside. Therefore, it is used very successfully
with many types of ammunition.
4. 20-Foot Half-Height Container
These containers are 8-feet wide and 20-feet long, however they have only 4-feet
3-inches in height. They have fixed sides and one and drops down to allow easy access by
a forklift. Although there is no top on the container, bows and tarpaulins are provided to
cover the contents. These containers are used for extremely heavy ammunition that does
not take up very much space. Therefore, these containers are extremely useful for
maximum utilization of space when transporting very heavy ammunition. [Ref. 4:p. 17]
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5. 20-Foot Flatracks
A flatrack is a shipping platform with endwalls and no top or sides. Flatracks used
for ammunition shipments are 8-feet wide, 8-feet high and 20-feet long with container
handling fittings and forklift pockets. Flatracks are used to transport high cube munitions.
[Ref. 4:p. 35]
The flatrack is the least desirable type of container to use with ammunition because
it does not provide much security for the ammunition.
6. Load and Roll Pallet (LRP)
The LRP is a steel frame platform designed to fit inside a standard 20-foot ISO
container. One end of the platform is fitted with rollers. To move the platform, the end
without the roller is lifted by a forklift, or perhaps a truck with a winch, and the load can
then be rolled into or out of a container. This system is primarily used for transporting
missiles. [Ref 4:p. 39]
E. AMMUNITION CONTAINERIZATION PROGRAM
Prior to and during Desert Storm/Desert Shield, the MILVAN-Ammunition
Restraint was the primary ammunition container. Because the majority of munitions were
transported by breakbulk methods during the Gulf Conflict, the need for additional
containers was not realized until retrograde operations began. Hence the MSC procured a
variety of 20 foot containers from commercial sources to support the retrograde program.
The six types of containers previously mentioned are maintained in the DoD inventory but
they lack in the number needed to meet the needs of future major contingencies. Yet,
there are no current plans for additional procurement.
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DoD Directive 4500.37. Management Of The DoD Intermodal Container System ,
clearly states that containerization is the preferred method of ammunition shipment. The
services are required to maintain a container capability to meet contingency throughput
requirements. [Ref. 5] However, in spite of DoD policy and the findings of MRS, today,
not enough emphasis is placed on expanding DoD inventory of ammunition containers as
evidenced in the lessons learned from TURBO CADS. If sufficient number of ammunition
containers are prestaged at various ammunition handling facilities, the military will
certainly be able to respond faster to hostile threats during a contingency.
F. AMMUNITION MOVEMENTS DURING DESERT STORM/DESERT
SHIELD
When Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, the U.S. military responded
superbly. The ability of logisticians to move massive amounts of personnel and material
into the region was the key to the success of Operations Desert Shield /Desert Storm. The
effort included movement of over 500,000 personnel and 7 million tons of equipment by
the end of the conflict. However, the use of containers in sealift operations accounted for
only 20 percent of the total material moved. [Ref. 6:p. 25]
The conflict was the first time the U.S. military deployed its forces overseas since
the commercial maritime industry switched to the container ship as the primary ship type.
In the past, the military had no problem getting breakbulk ships from the commercial
industry to move its cargo. However, this was not the case for Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. Military Sealift Command (MSC) ended up chartering many Roll-on/Roll-off
(Ro/Ro) or breakbulk ships because the military was not adapted to take full advantage of
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containerization. Although some of what was shipped went by containerization, of
300,000 tons of ammunition shipped, only five percent was containerized. [Ref. 7:p. 21]
Although containerization of ammunition had previously been recognized as more
efficient than the breakbulk method, the containerization infrastructure was not prepared
to implement the process.
Hence, through the use of breakbulk ships, ammunition shipments arrived
approximately 42 days after the initial surge movement to the Gulf. [Ref. 8: p. 20] As
previously mentioned, the sheathing requirement for a breakbulk ship prior to loading
ammunition is a long and tedious process and it significantly slows down the movement of
a breakbulk ship when compared to a container vessel.
Along with the reasons stated above, the bottom line reasons for the lack of
containerizing ammunition were as follows:
1
)
Limited availability of ammunition suitable containers
2) Lack of west coast containerized ammunition capability
3) Lack of container handling equipment at the units in the field and PODs. [Ref.
9:p. 49]
There also is one other factor that hindered containerizing ammunition. During the
sustainment phase of the conflict, the majority of military material shipped to the Gulf was
transported on commercially flagged vessels under the terms of the Special Middle East
Shipping (SMES) Agreement. This agreement, between the MSC and chartered
commercial carriers, provided only for regular shipment of general military cargo. The
agreement did not include provisions for ammunition. As a result, ammunition had to be
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transported by Fast Sealift Ship (FSS), Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships or chartered
vessels. [Ref. 10:p. 2]
G. VULNERABILITY OF READY RESERVE FORCE (RRF) READINESS
Established in 1976, the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) today consists of mostly
former dry cargo and tanker vessels and are considered outmoded for commercial shipping
because of container technology, automated diesel-powered propulsion, and cargo
handling systems. The average ship in RRF is about 25 years old. [Ref. 1 1] These ships
are managed by Maritime Administration (MARAD) which is a part of the Department of
Transportation.
The breakbulk vessels, a form of a dry cargo vessel, that the military has in the
RRF are slow to load/offload and are costly to operate because they are old. Additionally,
declining numbers of merchant mariners as well as the skill levels required to operate these
vessels, coupled with vessel maintenance problems, have become a real concern for future
military sealift. Therefore, the breakbulk vessels are becoming more difficult to compete
in today's fast-paced world and it is likely that few of them will be available for
ammunition transport in the future.
During the Desert Storm/Desert Shield operation, the military did not activate RRF
in its entirety, nevertheless, there were sailing delays due to lack of complete manning and
this may have been one of the reasons why it took 42 days to deliver ammunition to the
Gulf as previously noted. Unless the problems associated with managing the RRF can be
corrected, the future of military sealift may remain vulnerable. As a way to counter the
vulnerability of RRF readiness in the future, DoD should invest more efforts in the
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utilization of container ships as its main source of transportation to the fullest extend
possible.
H. SUMMARY
MRS stated the need for a west coast ammunition container port and
recommended that NWS Concord should be the logical choice. It also stated that
modernizing the ammunition handling facility at Chinhae along with Concord would
significantly improve readiness in a likely event of MRC-W scenario. These two
modernization efforts will be discussed further in the following chapters.
TURBO CADS Exercise provided a realistic challenge to test DoD's ability to
incorporate intermodalism into its container distribution system in the Pacific theater.
Although the exercise satisfactorily achieved its objectives, through the lessons learned, it
is apparent that the lack of CHEs and containers will continue to limit DoD from taking a
full advantage of intermodal transport. In order to be better equipped for future
contingencies, DoD should procure additional CHEs and containers and establish
programs to successfully respond to potential threats.
The Gulf conflict was a success in a macro sense, however, there were flaws in the
ammunition transport due to limited availability of container equipment and facilities. If
containerization can be fully implemented through all facets of sealift, the need to maintain
the RRF should diminish and the problems associated with RRF maintenance and
management could disappear as a result. Therefore, maintaining a fleet of containers and




in. CONTAINERIZATION OF AMMUNITION EFFORTS IN ROK
A. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. established a plan to modernize the existing ammunition facility in
Chinhae, Korea in 1992. When this project is completed, the modernized facility will be
fully equipped to support a throughput capacity that will be necessary to support a military
contingency in the region. This chapter will examine the status of the existing facility as
well as the efforts which are currently being implemented to upgrade the existing facility.
The present and future ammunition handling capability of the site will also be discussed.
B. CHINHAE AMMUNITION PIER
1. History
In the 27 September 1991 Journal of Commerce, VADM Donovan, then-
Commander, Military Sealift Command, stated, "We were loading ammunition the same
ways the Phoenicians were .... we have to make better use of containerized ammunition
and ships" The VADM's comment is a good illustration of both the past and present
ammunition handling ability in the ROK. Since the cessation of the Korean Conflict in
1953, the loading, unloading and transportation of ammunition via ships has not changed
much at the Chinhae Ammunition Pier, the country's only designated peacetime
ammunition handling facility.
2. Location and Facility
Chinhae is located on the southern coast of the ROK, about 45 miles west ofPusan
(Appendix B), the country's principal seaport. The existing facility at the Chinhae
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Ammunition Pier is approximately 600 feet long and 90 feet wide and the draft alongside
the pier is about 30 feet deep. Two rail tracks extend the length of the pier which has
deck strength of 600 pounds per square foot. [Ref. 12:p. 5] The existing infrastructure
at Chinhae is not adequate to accommodate modern container ships.
3. Organization
The Chinhae Ammunition Pier is operated by the Port Operations Group (POG), a
ROK Army transportation unit, the counterpart of the U.S. Military Traffic Management
Command (MTMC). As a result of the U.S. and ROK Single Ammunition Logistics
System Korea (SALS-K) host nation agreement, during all ammunition operations in
Chinhae, POG and its contracted crew perform all stevedoring activities. Three teams of
POG crew normally are assign to the port facility in two twelve-hour shifts. MTMC and
other U.S. safety officials are present at the site during the operation and provide guidance
and assistance in ensuring adherence to all loading, offloading, and handling doctrines.
Once offloaded, the ammunition is distributed to various sites within Korea for the United
States Forces Korea (USFK) use.
C. DISCUSSION
There have been various studies and recommendations to improve the ammunition
transportation and handling operations. All share at least one common finding;
containerization ensures more efficient and expeditious movement of ammunition. In
addition to decrease transit and handling times, containerization reduces cargo damage
liability during transit, which is an extremely important safety factor in ammunition
transportation.
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Currently, handling facilities at the Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point
(MOTSU) have accounted for over 90% of ammunition shipments from the United States
to Europe being containerized. To achieve this end in the Pacific arena, a meeting
involving the U.S. Program Manager for Ammunition Logistics, the ROK Ministry of
Defense Logistics Bureau, and the ROK Army Staff was initiated to discuss the possibility
of modernizing the Chinhae Ammunition Pier. [Ref. 13]
Subsequent to this initial meeting, and upon request from both the ROK Ministry
of Defense and the USFK, the Military Traffic Management Command Transportation
Engineering Agency (MTMCTEA) provided suggestions for incorporating a container
handling facility in the Chinhae ammunition operation. Upon completion of the site survey
by MTMCTEA engineers, two prototype design proposals were submitted to the ROK
Ministry of Defense. One proposal recommended replacing the existing breakbulk facility
with a new containerized facility. The other proposal outlined the prospect of
supplementing the existing breakbulk facility with a- co-located container handling facility
providing dual ammunition handling capacity. The ROK Ministry of Defense chose the
latter option for the following reasons:
1) The ROK deemed the cost of each proposal to be approximately equal.
2) The ROK favored the concept of having dual handling capability for it provides
more versatility in ammunition handling operations. [Ref. 12:p. 1]
If in fact the cost of each proposal is equal, the choice of ROK Defense seems to be a




The study submitted by MTMCTEA [Ref. 12] outlined the necessary technical
requirements of the proposed facility at Chinhae. Three areas of concern were identified:
1) constructing a pier capable of accommodating modern container ships and their massive
offload capability, 2) addition of cargo handling equipment, and 3) the construction of an
ammunition holding facility.
1. Pier Construction Requirements
The study utilized the C9-M class, one of the largest modern container vessel,
vessel as a guide for pier dimension requirements. A typical commercial C9-M vessel has
the following characteristics: [Ref. 14]
Dead Weight 57,075 tons
Draft 38 ft
Overall Length 950 ft
Maximum Beam 106ft
Capacity 3400 TEUs
A comparison of the C9-M vessel and the existing pier at Chinhae is shown in
Table 1. The proposed pier is 75% longer and 30% deeper to accommodate C9-M vessels.
Additionally, the pier will have a deck strength capable of handling a minimum of 1,000












Length 600 ft 1050 ft 950 ft
Width 90 ft 150 ft 106 ft
Draft 30.5 ft 40 ft 38 ft
Deck Strength 600 pd/sq ft 1000 pd/sq ft N/A
Table 1 . Present and Future Chinhae Ammunition Pier.
FromRef. [13]
2. Cargo Handling Requirements
Besides having the ability of providing all vital husbanding services, the new pier
will also provide necessary CHE required to support container vessel offloads. Two rail
mounted gantry cranes (Appendix C) will be capable of transiting the entire 950 feet berth.
Initially, the pier will require two container handlers (Appendix D) capable of moving 20
and 40 foot containers. These vehicles will support 50,000 pounds and be able to stack
two 20 or 40 foot containers. It appears that rail will not be fully utilized since only 60%
of the projected 3,200 feet of track will be initially operational. However, improvements
in rail usage are anticipated in the future. In the interim, yard tractors (Appendix E) will
transport ammunition containers form the pier to the storage facility. When the pier is
completely upgraded, the ROK POG will maintain full responsibility for manning the pier
and anticipates that much needed CHE training will be provided by MTMC to improve
their handling capability of 20 foot as well as 40 foot containers. [Ref 12:p. 19]
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3. Ammunition Holding Facility Requirements
The study also points out that the anticipated offload capacity will be 600 TEUs
equivalent to 8,700 short tons (STONS)* and this will present a throughput problem due
to the inadequacy of the ROK rail and trucking infrastructure. Current ROK rail and
highway structure have limited resources to rapidly support such a high throughput. Thus
to meet the high input demand, the study recommends that a large ammunition holding
facility be built to store the offload ammunition before its transit.
Table 2 provides a comparison of the future ammunition handling capability of
Chinhae to the current handling capability ofNaval Weapons Station (NWS) Concord and
MOTSU to gain a better understanding of the relative scope of this project. The net
explosive weight as indicated below is the maximum total weight of ammunition that is















Table 2. A comparison of the future ammunition handling capability of Chinhae vs
other facilities.
FromRef. [1]
Although Chinhae will have a much smaller net explosive weight threshold due to
its dense geographical location, the plan for Chinhae is to equal MOTSU's current
container handling capability. Additionally, Chinhae will triple the current capability of
A short ton is equivalent to 2000 pounds
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Concord which can only handle containers when certain breakbulk ships are equipped with
self-sustaining container handling gears onboard.
The funding for the overall project is to be assumed by the ROK and the project is
estimated to be 40 % complete as of December 1995, with final construction expected to
be finished by December 1997. Appendix F provides a complete overview of the
improvement plan at Chinhae. [Ref. 5]
The resulting capabilities estimated from planned improvements are substantial.
Given the estimated savings of 75% in load and offload time as indicated by MRS, over
the past 3 years, it is estimated that total of 1 8 1 days could have been saved through use
of containerization as illustrated in Table 3 below:
Calendar Year Actual Breakbulk Prooosed Container Days could be
Days Pays Saved
92 92 19 73
93 41 9 32
94 96 20 76
Table 3. Chinhae Ammunition Pier Annual Break vs. Container Loadout Comparison.
After Ref. [13]
E. SUMMARY
The significance of the upgrade at Chinhae, ROK cannot be overstated. The ability
to transport fully containerized ammunition from CONUS POE, to Chinhae Ammo Pier,
POD, is an integral component ofU.S. military strategy in the region.
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Although it will take a while to fully train the personnel to handle the expected
throughput capacity, this task should become easier through time and experience. Clearly,
the combined efforts of US-ROK to modernize Chinhae Ammo Pier is a positive step
towards fulfilling the goal of Mobility Requirements Study.
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IV. CONTAINERIZATION OF AMMUNITION EFFORTS IN THE U.S.
A. INTRODUCTION
According to the findings of Mobility Requirements study (MRS), the DoD is in
the process of establishing a plan to upgrade the existing ammunition handling facility in
Concord, CA. When this project is completed, it should have the capability to handle and
transport ammunition much more efficiently throughout the Pacific region. This chapter
describes the significance of the MRS as it relates to the Concord project. It examines the
status of the existing facility as well as the efforts that are anticipated to upgrade the
facility in the near future. Finally, the future ammunition handling capability of the facility
and its potential cost savings are also discussed.
B. CONCORD WEAPONS STATION
1. History
Naval Weapons Station Concord, CA began its national defense role in 1942 as an
annex built to supplement the Mare Island Naval Magazine built in 1857. In the next half
century, a significant change to its size, mission, and its importance to national defense
created the Weapons Station of today, the West Coast Ammunition Ocean Terminal for
the Department of Defense. [Ref 16]
As illustrated in Figure 1, during the World War II, the Vietnam and Korea Wars,
the station was the principal port for the transshipment of ammunition to U.S. and allied
combat forces. During the Desert Shield /Storm, the station was one of three principal
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bulk ammunitions outloading facilities with Concord supplying approximately 30 percent
of the explosive ordnance, amounting to more than 400,000 tons. [Ref 17]
(1000 tons)
°WWII KOREA VIETNAM GULF
From 1945-1994
Figure 1 . NWS Concord Annual Loadouts
From Ref. [17]
2. Location
Naval Weapons Stations Concord (Appendix G) is located approximately 35 miles
northeast of San Francisco. Access to the facility is through the San Francisco Bay, the
San Pablo Strait and Bay, the Carquinez Strait and the Suisan Bay. Concord is served by
the Southern Pacific, Union Pacific and Sacramento Northern railroads which pass
through the tidal area. State Highway 4 provides access to the station, and connects to all
west coast freeway systems.
3. Mission
Naval Weapons Station Concord has the following key missions [Ref. 1 7]
:
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1) Maintain and operate a DoD explosive ordnance outloading and transshipment
facility.
2) Maintain and operate an expendable ordnance storage and receipt, segregation
and issue facility.
3) Maintain intermediate level maintenance for ordnance and other material assets.
4. Facility
Naval Weapons Station Concord has 3 full loop piers with 6 berths (Appendix H)
and a barge pier. The facility can provide service for up to nine combatant and military
explosive supply vessels at the same time. Pier three which has the largest capacity can
handle a vessel loaded to up to 1 1.2 million pounds of net explosive weight (NEW) and
the barge pier also has the capability of handling 750,000 pounds of NEW. As the
Pacific's largest ordnance handling facility, it has the capacity to simultaneously handle a
total of 24 million pounds of NEW and 63,000 tons of ordnance storage capacity. [Ref.
18]
Primarily being a breakbulk terminal, the existing facility has the infrastructures
required to support outstanding breakbulk ammunition operations but limited container
handling capability. Table 4 illustrates the characteristics and current ammunition handling
























As previously mentioned, the Mobility Requirements Study identified the need for
a west coast container port as a major component of strategic mobility. The most ideal
proposal currently being considered by DoD is upgrading the existing facility of Naval
Weapons Station Concord into a container handling capable facility. The objective is to
achieve a maximum capability of handling 600 TEUs per day, which will equal the
anticipated handling capacity of Chinhae Ammunition Pier upon completion of its upgrade.
Currently, Concord's breakbulk facility at best can handle about 200 TEUs per
day without utilizing modern container handling methods. The containers can be loaded
onto a ship either by the floating cranes which are maintained at the pier or they can be
loaded by ship's own cranes, in case of a self-sustaining vessel. [Ref. 20] However, these
container handling methods are neither very efficient nor very favorable, since they do not
meet the throughput requirement identified by the MRS.
Initially, the MRS recommended that Concord's capabilities be increased to equal
MOTSU, however the original cost estimate to complete this transformation was over
$126 million. This total included pier upgrades, container cranes, container chassis,
tractors, straddle carriers, etc.
,
as well as increased holding area to store 1000 containers.
[Ref. 21:p. 23] This would turn NWS Concord into a fully functioning containerized
ammunition port. Given the large price tag, this upgrade was turned down.
As a result, a new $57 million plan was developed and proposed. The itemized list
of the expenditures for NWS Concord containerization project is as follows:
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Ordnance Operations Bldg. $3 .5M
Upgrade to Pier 3 $12.3 M
Container Cranes and Handling Equipment $14.4M
Rail/Truck Explosive Holding Yard $20.0M
Auxiliary Equipment $ 2.2M
Union Pacific Right-of-way $ 1 6M
Environmental $ 3.0M
TOTAL $57.0M
The plan was also developed under the following assumptions:
1) An adequate number ofDoD and commercial trucks and chassis would be
available for moving containers on station.
2) Properly configured truck and rail assets are available to move the containers to
Concord.
3) Just-in-time delivery is possible, to minimize the holding area required.
4) No container stuffing facilities would be required at Concord. All containers
would arrive ready for transport by ship.
5) The rate of 500+ container per day would be required for only a brief period.
[Ref. 22:p. 6]
Although this new plan didn't fully match the overall capability of MOTSU,
because ofNWS Concord's excellent rail and truck access as well as its high NEW limit, it
was determined that NWS Concord could possibly handle the large flow of containers
required of a container ammunition facility similar to MOTSU.
The preliminary design study prepared by Naval Facilities Engineering Command
[Ref. 3] outlined the technical requirements which were necessary to upgrade the existing
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facility in Concord. According to the study, in order for NWS Concord to carryout an
additional mission of west coast terminal for container ammunition transshipment, an
upgrade to pier 3 was necessary to convert it into a container handling pier. Additionally,
the study indicated the following:
1) Acquire large container cranes.
2) Construct container storage pads.
3) Procure support equipment.
4) Construct support facilities.
In summary, the study revealed that the conditions of the current infrastructure for
receiving and processing its capacity was inadequate and that merely adding the cranes
necessary to achieve a handling rate of 600 containers a day would not be sufficient to
handle the large flow of containers. Therefore, the study recommended the following
major projects and they will be implemented in the future plan:
1) Upgrade Ammunition Pier 3 to accommodate two 40-ton capacity container
cranes.
2) Construct Rail and Truck Explosive Holding Yard, providing 8 holding pads,
with additional rail interchange, inspection and unloading capacity.
3) Construct administration building for waterfront operations.
4) Acquisition of Union Pacific Rail right-of-way around the facility.
D. ISSUES
The preliminary design study, similar to the one conducted by MTMCTEA for
Chinhae, also utilized C9-M class container vessel as a guide for pier dimension
requirements. Although the exact specifications and the details of the overall project are
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still being developed, it appears that the width of Pier 3 will be extended by 1 5 feet and
become 100 feet wide, but the overall length of the pier is expected to remain the same at
1220 feet. The 40-ton container cranes are planned to be stowed at each end of the pier.
With the 1200 feet crane girder and the container cranes stowed at each end, this will be
approximately 1000 feet of pier and this space could be utilized for breakbulk operation as
well, when the cranes are not in use. Therefore, this dual handling capability should add
much versatility to NWS Concord's existing operation. [Ref. 14]
However, there is one major limitation to NWS Concord's location. Along the 39
mile approach to the Concord facility to Concord from San Francisco, there are two 135
feet railroad bridges which limit C9-M types of container vessels capable of utilizing the
port. Less than half of the 93 registered U.S. flagged container vessels can clear the
bridges and depending on the availability of smaller container vessels, this presents a
serious, potential problem. [Ref. 23 :p. 4]
In order to alleviate this problem, Army Corps of Engineers are currently studying
the feasibility of dredging the channel to overcome the height restriction as well as
dredging beneath the pier to increase its current berth depth from 35 feet to 42 feet in
order to accommodate a fully loaded C9-M vessel, having a draft of 38 feet. However, if
these options are not viable, there may be an alternate possibility of using foreign flagged
vessels. An estimated 721 of the 1535 foreign vessels meet the height restrictions of the
approach to Concord. [Ref. 23 :p. 5] Many foreign flagged vessels have been utilized in
numerous recent conflicts to transport U.S. military cargo and proved to be quite reliable.
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It is anticipated that in 1999, when Pier 3 is fully upgraded with the container
handling capability, approximately 20 lifts can be completed per hour. Based on this
information, a fully loaded C9-M vessel with a capacity of 18,995 STONS could be
offloaded in only 2 days by the two 40-ton container cranes. A typical breakbulk vessel
which has a much smaller load capacity on average takes approximately 9 days to offload
its cargo. [Ref. 1] Table 5 below compares ammunition handling capabilities container and
breakbulk vessels and clearly illustrates the enormous advantages of container versus
breakbulk operations.
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Table 5. Breakbulk and Containership Comparison
After Ref. [1]
Furthermore, based on the MRS' general rule that 75% less time is required to
load/offload a container vessel, the number of days that could have been saved by
container vs breakbulk method for the calendar year 1992 through 1994 at NWS Concord
is illustrated in Table 6 below.


















Table 6. NWS Concord Annual Breakbulk vs. Container Loadout Comparison.
After Ref. [20]
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These analyses indicate, the significance of the upgrade at NWS Concord cannot
be over emphasized.
E. COST/BENEFIT ANAYSIS
Along with the benefits of the time savings associated with ammunition
containerization, there are additional cost/benefits associated with ammunition
containerization. If a cost comparison could be done between a breakbulk and container
operation, it should be clear that cost savings through container operation would be quite
significant, since breakbulk operation requires much more manpower due to multiple
handling requirements of ammunition as previously mentioned and also ammunition
throughput being much lower. Based on the author's experience, about 60 TEUs
equivalent units of ammunition can be handled through breakbulk operation on a daily
basis. Unfortunately, ammunition handling cost data was not available regarding breakbulk
from NWS Concord. However, using a similar cost comparison done by NWS Concord
between working a self sustaining container ship versus modern container operation per
day, the following data was collected :
"^^^*-~^ilPersonnel
Skill Level *—
-^. Self Sustaining Container Operation
General Foreman 2 2




Office Personnel 4 4
Cargo Handler 2 2
Cargo Scheduler 2 2
Rigger 4 4
Truck Drivers 16 20
Rail Workers 24 48
Traffic Controller 2 2
Total 146 166
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Table 7. Cost Comparison between Self Sustaining vs. Container Operation
From Ref. [24]
As previously mentioned, self sustaining container operation consists of handling
containers by utilizing floating cranes or ship's own cranes.
The data was based on what the average self sustaining and container operation
currently requires. Therefore, 200 TEUs were assumed to be handled by a self sustaining
operation and 600 TEUs by two container cranes respectively. Additionally, each shift
was assumed to be 10 hours long and $81.86 was utilized as the average pay rate per man
hour.
Based on the above information, it is evident that although the total cost of
container operation exceeds the self sustaining operation, the cost per container by
container operation is only about 40% of self sustaining operation or $370 ($598 - $228)
less than the cost of self sustaining operation. This cost reduction per container for
container operation obviously is as a result of a higher container throughput. Clearly, the
cost savings of the container operation will be much more significant if a total of 40,000
TEUs per month is assumed to be utilized in a major regional conflict.
Although the modernization project for NWS Concord will be costly due to its
high initial capital investment, in the long run, the benefits should certainly outweigh the
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costs. Using three hypothetical scenarios with the cost comparison data from Table 7, (1)
if a major regional conflict is assumed to occur every 10 years with required TEUs of
40,000 per month, (2) if a multiple major regional conflict is to take place every 25 years
with a required TEUs of 70,000 per month, and (3) normal peacetime operation with a
required TEUs of 1,500, the break-even point of the investment can be achieved through
the following equation:
# ofmonth to break even = total capital investment.
(savings per container by container Ops vs self sustaining ) * (# of containers moved per month)
Using the equation then,
Scenario (1): Single MRC every 10 years = $57.000.000
$370 * 40,000
Scenario (2): Multiple MRC every 25 years =$57.000.000
$370 * 70,000
Scenario (3): Normal Peacetime Operation = $57.000.000
$370 * 1,500
For scenario (1), break-even point can be reached in 3.85 months and for scenario
(2), only 2.2 months, and 102.7 months for scenario (3), respectively neglecting present
value or capital discount in the calculations. However, in reality, the break-even point
should be reached much quicker because cost savings per container by container operation
versus breakbulk is much higher; these break-even points illustrate potential cost savings
of container operation assuming worst case scenarios. Therefore, based on these break-
even analyses, it should be clear that the benefits of the modern container operation will




It is possible to utilize MOTSU as the POE to transport ammunition to the Pacific,
however from a logistics stand point, this is not desirable in time of a war because of
longer travel time. Therefore, Naval Weapons Station Concord is and should remain to be
major ordnance corridor to the Pacific.
Although there are some details yet to be worked out to resolve some potential
problems, such as bridge clearance, the overall plan should nicely execute the
recommendations of the MRS. When NWS Concord has the added capability to handle
containers as well as breakbulk like Chinhae Ammo Pier, this will not only cut down the
handling time significantly but it will also allow tremendous flexibility and cost savings
through its overall operation.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Today, in order to protect vital U.S. interests throughout the world, future U.S.
military strategy should continue to mandate that logistical planners adopt containerization
as the primary mode for transporting ammunition. If the world becomes more prone to
threats by hostile forces, perhaps in a multiple or simultaneous major regional conflicts, the
ability to respond quickly to opposition will become most important. Although roll-
on/roll-ofF vessels are ideal for rapid deployments, sustained conflicts must be supported
by quantities of material unsuitable for these types of ships. Because the commercial
maritime industry is predominantly composed of container vessels, rendering breakbulk
shipping virtually is obsolete, it is logical to assume that containerization must be
implemented without delay. The limited potential for supporting a major regional conflict,
as outlined in the MRS, highlights the need for rapid change in ammunition handling
operations.
Clearly, the link between the upgraded facilities at Chinhae and Concord is crucial
to the success of the MRC-W scenario and will bring about many benefits to the U.S.
DoD. From logistics stand point, the reduction in travel time due to containerization of
ammunition will significantly reduce the stock pile of ammunition in Korea and this has
many associated benefits. First, because DoD's level of ammunition safety stock in Korea
can be reduced as transportation service is improved via containerization, inventory
management can be more optimally conducted. Second, containerization of ammunition
will improve customer service level as ammunition can be transported more rapidly. Third,
the overall effect of ammunition containerization will improve readiness posture in the
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Pacific region as container ships are faster and have larger loading capacity than breakbulk
ships; containerization will eliminate unnecessary ammunition handling thus expediting
supply to the forces in need.
Although the modernization projects are costly, in order to meet the operational
tempo required by MRS, they are absolutely needed. The enhanced facilities will most
successfully satisfy the necessary throughput requirement. Additionally, the improved
facility at Chinhae and Concord will produce two significant cost benefits. First,
containerization of ammunition will reduce holding cost as the level of safety stock is
reduced. Second, the cost per container in container handling operation will also be
reduced.
As military personnel and equipment are reduced from overseas bases, the role of
military sealift will become more significant in order to execute all of its missions, and
containerization will play a vital role. Capability to handle containers and having proper
container handling equipment at points of embarkation and debarkation are very crucial as
witnessed by the TURBO CADS Exercise and the Desert Storm/Desert Shield conflict. In
order to obtain maximum efficiency through the use of containerization, the military must
work towards utilizing commercial assets that are readily available now and in the future.
DoD should also look into the possibility of establishing container handling facilities at all
overseas installations where the U.S. military presence is dominant in order to implement
containerization of ammunition to the fullest extent possible.
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Out of Continental United States
POD Port of Debarkation
POE Port ofEmbarkation
ROK Republic ofKorea
RO/RO Roll on/Roll off
RRF Ready Reserve Force
SALS-K Single Ammunition Logistics System-Korea
SMES Special Middle East Shipping
STONS Short Tons
TEU Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit
USCINPAC United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific
USFK United States Forces Korea
USPACOM United States Pacific Command
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APPENDIX F. IMPROVEMENT SPECIFICATIONS, CHINHAE
AMMUNITION PIER
The following are the proposed specifications for the Ammunition Facility at Chinhae.
Pier Specifications
Total Length 1,050 feet
Width 150 feet
Berth Length 950 feet
Deck Strength 1,000 pounds per square foot
Container Handling Equipment Required
2 container cranes capable of lifting one 20, 40, 45 or two 20 foot containers, each rated
at 1 12,000 pounds minimum capacity
2 container handlers capable of double stacking both 20 and 40 foot containers, minimum
lift capability of 50,000 pounds
Yard tractors and chassis capable of moving 20 and 40 foot containers from the pier to the
ammunition holding facility
Ammunition Holding Facility
1.5 million pound NEW maximum, waiverable to 3 million pounds
550 TEUs storage capability
2 Ammunition holding modules / 6 Individual pads per module
48 TEUs capacity per holding pad
Source: Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering Agency
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APPENDIX G. MAP OF NAVAL WEAPONS STATION CONCORD
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